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Abstract 
We study care arrangement decisions in Italy, where families are increasingly delegating 
the role of primary caregiver to external (paid) people also for the provision of home care. 
We consider a sample of households with a dependent elderly person cared for either at 
home or in a residential  home, extracted from a survey representative of the population of  
Italy’s Emilia-Romagna region. We investigate the determinants of a household’s decision 
to opt for one of the following three alternatives: the institutionalisation of elderly family 
members, informal home care, or paid home care. We estimate two model specifications, 
based on a simultaneous and a sequential decision process respectively, the results of which 
are fairly consistent. Disability related variables, rather than family characteristics, emerge 
as the main determinants of institutionalisation. On the other hand, household 
characteristics and socio-economic variables are more influential when it comes to 
choosing between informal and formal home care provisions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to UN estimates (United Nations, 2012), Italy has one of the oldest populations 
in the world, and this is due to declining fertility and increased life expectancy. With an 
increasing percentage of the population being constituted by the over-80s,  the demand for 
Long Term Care (LTC) is expected to increase even further in coming years, as a 
consequence of the increasing number of individuals with chronic functional or cognitive 
impairments. 
LTC financing and provision result from the interaction between three main institutions: the 
family, the market and the State (Cremer, Pestieau and Ponthiere, 2012). Various measures 
can be adopted, each with its strengths and weaknesses: public coverage, private insurance 
or out-of pocket payment on the financing side; residential or home care, formal or 
informal assistance, on the provision side. It has now been recognised that cultural factors 
and the societal context may also affect households’ decisions. In Europe a “north-south 
gradient” has been identified, with Nordic countries  favouring State support and generous 
home care services, resulting in a considerable degree of formal care, while a mix of formal 
and informal care prevails in Continental Europe, and Mediterranean countries remain 
largely dependent on informal care (Suanet et al.,  2012). 
Although in Italy most LTC is still provided by informal caregivers within the family, 
households face increasing difficulty in ensuring the levels of assistance the elderly 
population requires, due to changes in the size and composition of households. Moreover, 
care provision is also challenged by declining family ties, the increased presence of women 
in the labour force, and the availability of formal care alternatives. Similar trends can be 
seen in most developed countries, and as such have raised an intense debate over the 
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determinants of living and care arrangements for the frail elderly population, designed to 
shape policies capable of curbing increasing LTC costs, and of enhancing the quality of 
assistance.  
Since the Eighties, Italy has experienced significant flows of immigrants coming in from 
former socialist countries, most of whom illegal, with a high female component  bolstering 
the ranks of the unofficial labour force (Kofman et al., 2000). Immigration has further 
increased in recent years, in particular from Mediterranean African countries, and there is 
documentary evidence of the fact that two thirds of such women are engaged in housework 
(domestic or personal care work), frequently replacing the adult child as a household’s 
primary caregiver. This process has been witnessed in all southern European countries, 
where elderly care has traditionally been centred on a family-based model; in fact, these 
countries are now  the recipients of a flow of increasingly feminized migration, leading to 
the transition from a “family” model of care to one based on the contribution of the 
“immigrant in the family” (Bettio et al., 2006). Italy is a noteworthy case where empirical 
evidence indicates that the country is characterised by the highest ratio of female 
immigrants active in the personal care sector (Bettio et al., 2006; Simonazzi, 2009). This 
process has been favoured by ongoing socio-demographic trends and by a public benefit 
system largely based on unconditional monetary transfers, in-kind public services that are 
largely insufficient to cover existing needs, and social norms governing filial responsibility 
that attach social stigma to the institutionalisation of the elderly. For many Italian families, 
the opportunity to purchase care services in a poorly regulated personal services market, 
largely based on unskilled female immigrants workforce (Villosio and Bizzotto, 2011), has 
ensured a low-cost substitute for professional home care services, and at the same time has 
 4 
mitigated the demand for admissions to assisted living facilities. The emerging model 
entails a division of responsibilities whereby the family retains the role of supervisor and 
coordinator of the whole process, while the task of directly assisting the frail elderly person 
is delegated to a round-the-clock (privately paid) unskilled caregiver with the public 
authorities acting as residual providers for health and paramedical services when needed. 
Our paper examines the determinants of living and care arrangements for frail elderly 
adults in terms of three mutually exclusive alternatives: admission to an assisted living 
facility, informal home care or paid home care. We employ two different specifications in 
order to analyse the factors associated with household’s choice. In the first one, the three 
options are modelled as simultaneous, whereas in the second one the household’s decision 
is modelled as a sequential process. In the first stage, the family chooses whether to 
institutionalise the elderly dependent or to assist him at home, while in the second stage, 
conditional on having opted for home care, households choose between informal and paid 
home care. We estimate multinomial and two-step discrete choice models to evaluate the 
impact of personal, household and local characteristics on living and care arrangement for 
older member of the family suffering of functional limitations in daily activities. The data 
are taken from a survey of 1400 households of the population of the Italian region Emilia-
Romagna, around 300 of whom include (at least) one dependent elderly person. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the relevant literature. In Section 
3 we illustrate the estimation strategy, while the dataset is presented in Section 4. Section 5 
discusses results and policy implications, and Section 6 offers a summary and the main 
conclusions. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
In the last two decades, a growing number of theoretical and empirical  studies have 
improved our understanding of household decisions on how to assist the elderly in need of 
regular help due to physical/mental impairment and limitations in daily activities.  
From the theoretical perspective, the main distinction is between those approaches that 
hypothesise common preferences within the household, and those that incorporate forms of 
family bargaining (Pezzin, et al., 2007; Byrne et al., 2009). In the latter case, strategic 
interaction can be motivated by altruism, or by the desire to protect future bequests 
(Bernheim, et al., 1985; Courbage and Eeckhoudt, 2012), and usually  involves the elderly 
parent and one child only, although certain studies also allow for the potentially divergent 
views of adult siblings (Hiedemann and Stern, 1999; Engers and Stern, 2002). 
Despite the challenging theoretical issues raised by inter- and intra-generational relations, 
in contexts where altruism, cultural attitudes, and moral and legal obligations interfere with 
economic motives, literature continues to be mainly empirically oriented, covering a wide 
array of topics. Seminal papers (including Kotlikoff and Morris, 1988; Boersch-Supan et 
al., 1988, 1990; Heiss et al., 2003; Dostie and Léger, 2005) used micro-data to study the 
determinants of decisions regarding the living arrangements of the elderly and their 
trajectories over time. The main objective of such studies has been to empirically assess to 
what extent demographic and socio-economic characteristics, health conditions and public 
policies, affect the choice between independent living, shared housing or admission to a 
nursing home. A second area of investigation focuses on the mutual interaction between the 
elderly’s living arrangements, care provision, and the labour market participation of adult 
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children (e.g. Ettner, 1996; Pezzin and Schone, 1997, 1999; Byrne et al., 2009; van 
Houtven et al.,  2013).  
However, research has tended to focus on the analysis of the factors affecting the choice of 
type of care, and  the interaction between such factors. Since most LTC continues to be  
provided by families, kin and friends, it is informal care that has been subjected to the 
closest scrutiny. The personal characteristics of both the elderly and their adult children, 
including age, gender, marital status, health and income, emerge as important determinants 
of the type of care provided by adult children.  
The core of such debate is the analysis of the relationship between formal and informal 
care, with the purpose of establishing whether these two types of care are substitutes or 
complements (van Houtven and Norton 2004; Sarma and Simpson, 2007; Hanaoka and 
Norton, 2008; Lee and Kim, 2012). Although the nature of the relationship is still 
controversial, existing evidence would suggest that while informal and formal care tend to 
be substitutes, they do complement one another in cases of severe disability, where formal 
care requires highly-skilled nursing and medical services. A complementary approach has 
also investigated whether public home care subsidies reduce nursing home use, or simply 
crowd out informal care (Hoerger et al., 1996; Pezzin and Schone, 1997). The main 
question is whether these subsidies affect co-residence (Orsini, 2010), which often reflects 
macro-structural  factors as well and is viewed as a reaction to economic insecurity and 
social uncertainties (Isengard and Szydlik, 2012). Moreover, a number of studies has 
specifically focused on the relationship between informal and institutional care and they do 
not always agree on whether help from family members affects nursing home admissions 
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(Hanley et al., 1990; Boaz and Muller, 1994; Lo Sasso and Johnson, 2002; Paraponaris et 
al., 2012).  
This mixed evidence probably depends on the various institutional contexts examined, on 
the limited available data, and most importantly of all, on the multidimensional nature of 
LTC , which results in complex patterns of response to LTC needs. 
Partly due to the difficulties in collecting detailed information regarding older adults 
assisted at home, in the past formal care has frequently been associated  exclusively with 
assistance in nursing homes, or with in-kind public services, whilst neglecting the role of 
privately paid caregivers who assist the frail elderly in their homes. More recently, 
however, richer sources of data together with the increased importance of the issue in 
policy terms, following the development of community-based care and the reduction in the 
potential for informal care within families, have encouraged a more  precise consideration 
of formal care provided at home (Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009; Paraponaris et al., 
2012; Balia and Brau, 2013).   
One of the main limitations of these studies is that they mainly use surveys covering only 
the elderly population living in the community, but not those individuals living in 
institutions. We contribute to fill this gap by jointly studying the determinants of elderly 
living arrangements and of home care solutions, and by including the institutionalised 
elderly in our analysis. 
A second contribution is that while several studies have incorporated societal values and 
cultural factors in the analysis of care provision, and have proven important at the national 
level (Bolin, 2008;  Suanet et al., 2012; Di Novi et al. 2013), cultural views at the 
household level can be equally relevant but tend to be overlooked owing to a lack of 
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adequate information. We, on the contrary, are able to take advantage here of a unique 
survey that includes questions reflecting both households’ views on the best way to 
organise and finance LTC services, and the strength of family ties. Thanks to this 
information, we can directly test the impact of such factors on households’ decisions, while 
at the same time reducing unobserved heterogeneity vis-à-vis the main drivers of 
households’ decisions. 
Third, we study a country which despite those distinctive features previously discussed, has 
received relatively little attention in the literature so far. Earlier works – including Wolf and 
Pinelli (1980); Tomassini and Wolf (2000); Tomassini, Wolf and Rosina (2003) – while 
providing an interesting picture of living arrangement decisions, lacked any detailed 
information on the magnitude of the functional limitations of the scope of the conclusions. 
More recently, Broese et al. (2006) investigated the question of socio-economic inequalities 
in the use of formal care, but they did not observe informal help provided within the 
household, while Lippi Bruni and Ugolini (2006) use the same dataset employed in the 
present paper, but only considered the distinction between nursing home and community 
care, neglecting to analyse the choice between informal and paid home care, which is one 
of the focal points of the present study. 
 
3. THE ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to jointly estimate living arrangement decisions 
(residential vs. home care) and those decisions concerning the type of care  (formal vs. 
informal care). Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we assume common 
preferences among family members, and decisions taken once-and-for-all. However, since 
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there is no unique way of describing the household decision-making process, we consider 
two alternative specifications for our reduced form equations: a simultaneous choice (Fig. 
1) among three non-ordered, mutually-exclusive alternatives (admission to an assisted 
living facility, informal care  or paid home care); and a sequential choice where the 
alternatives are residential or home care at the first stage, and informal  or paid care at the 
second stage, the latter choice being conditional on the family’s having previously opted for 
home care (Fig. 2): 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 
3.1 The simultaneous decision process 
We define Uij the utility of household i, i = 1, …N, that chooses type of care j: 
 
where X  is a vector of (observed) demographic, socio-economic and health characteristics 
of the household and of the elderly dependent person, which also includes area variables 
and the household’s opinions on the organisation of LTC services; ε is the (unobserved) 
error component. Control variables are common across alternatives, and the decision tree 
(Fig. 1) illustrates the simultaneous decision between: Residential Care (RC), Informal 
Home Care provided by family members or friends (IHC), and Paid Home Care provided 
by an external caregiver (PHC). The probability of choosing alternative j is : 
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This is often estimated using a MultiNomial Logit (MNL) model which assumes that 
household i compares the indirect utility of each arrangement (j=1…3) and selects the one 
guaranteeing the highest utility: 
 
where parameters β1, β2 and β3 are estimated in terms of maximum likelihood. One 
shortcoming of the MNL model is that it relies on the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA), which requires that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing any two 
alternatives is independent of the availability or attributes of other alternatives (Cheng and 
Long, 2007). Because of this, the MNL specification may appear inappropriate in this 
context, where two of the three alternatives are potentially perceived as close substitutes 
since both imply provision of care at home, whereas the third option implies the 
institutionalisation of the elderly person. One way to address the problem is to estimate a 
multinomial probit model (MNprobit) (Hoerger et al., 1996), where the random error term ε 
follows a multivariate normal distribution with a variance/covariance matrix Σ not 
restricted to be diagonal. In this case, the normalisation hypotheses permits identification of 
the model and, at the same time, relaxation of the IIA property. 
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Care, RC), or to provide care at home (Home Care, HC). Those families who opt for home 
care  may then choose between Informal Care (IHC) and Paid Home Care (PHC). The 
decision tree (Fig.2) illustrates the sequential model.  
At each stage, total utility for household i is expressed as the sum of two components, βjXi 
and εij, as in (1). The main difference lies in the set of available alternatives j which now 
differs from one stage to the next (j = RC, HC, at stage 1; j = IHC, PHC , at stage 2). Total 
utility is unobservable, but we can observe families’ choices concerning the type of care. 
Again, what is important for a household is the difference in total utility between the 
available alternatives at each stage, as reported in (4): 
(4) 
The differences in total utility can be represented as latent variables, and the information 
used to estimate the first-stage equation is drawn from the actual choice between RC and 
HC, as expressed by the dichotomous indicator yi1:  
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The sequential model implies that the second-stage decision only arises in the case of those 
households that previously chose HC, while the first-stage decision can be seen as a 
selection process, that is yi2, is observed only if yi1 = 1,  whereas information is missing 
otherwise. The main implication is that while εi1 is defined over the entire set of 
observations, εi2 is only defined  in regard to the sub-population for which yi1 = 1. A natural 
way to tackle the problem is to assume that the error components are drawn from a 
bivariate normal distribution, corrected for a sample selection with correlation coefficient 
ρ: ε
 i1, ε i2 ~ N(0,0,1,1, ρ) (Greene, 2011). This gives rise to three possible outcomes (RC, 
PHC and IHC), the unconditional probabilities of which are: 
 
 
where Ф and Ф2 respectively denote the univariate and bivariate standard normal 
cumulative distribution functions. This corresponds to a bivariate probit with sample 
selection (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981; Meng and Schmidt, 1985) with log-likelihood 
function: 
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4. THE DATA  
The study is based on a survey, carried out in 2002, of 1,405 families in the Emilia-
Romagna region of Italy, with its 4 million inhabitants. The survey was conducted by a 
professional firm, and involved personal interviews. Its main purpose was to elicit 
willingness to pay for coverage of the LTC expenditure risk (Brau and Lippi Bruni, 2008; 
Brau et al., 2010), and the sample was selected to ensure geographic and socio-economic 
representativity of the population (Cocchi et al., 2004). 
The questionnaire contained information on household composition, socio-economic status, 
employment and health conditions, and on attitudes towards financing health and social 
care. Moreover, a specific section  recorded the presence of family members aged 50 and 
over in need of regular assistance, including close relatives of the respondent (parents, 
grandparents, etc.) living in the community or institutionalised. Thus the survey gathered 
information on family members experiencing limitations in their daily activities, not only if 
they lived with the respondent but also if they lived independently, either with other family 
members or in an assisted living facility. The information on admissions to residential 
facilities, and on the identity of primary caregiver for the elderly dwelling in the 
community, enables us to estimate the determinants of both living and care arrangements. 
Although LTC provision can involve different players at one and the same time (nurses, 
skilled and unskilled personal caregivers, family members, friends etc.), there is evidence in 
the literature that  the majority of care for the elderly is provided by one specific person 
(Davey and Patsios, 1999). This is true in particular of Mediterranean countries, where a 
mix of formal and informal care is less frequently observed than in Continental European 
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and Nordic countries (Suanet et al. 2012). Therefore, within our context the identity of the 
primary caregiver strongly affects the type of care provided. 
We recorded data for 339 households with at least one dependent elderly person. However, 
missing information regarding some of the covariates (in most cases household income) left 
us with 279 observations to be used for our empirical analysis, with 231 dependent 
individuals living at home and 48 living in institutions. Table 1 reports the variables used in 
the empirical model and the associated descriptive statistics. 
The control variables can be broadly grouped into five categories: characteristics of the 
dependent elderly person (DE), demographic characteristics of the household, economic 
characteristics of the household, local area characteristics, and the head of the household’s 
opinions on the best way to finance and organize LTC services. 
DE characteristics are: age (age DE), gender (Female DE), length of disability (LTC spell) 
and a dummy taking value 1 for those who lived alone before the onset of disability (Single 
Living). Unlike most other surveys, the latter variable above does not express the living 
condition at the time of the interview, but it describes the situation when the elderly person 
in question was still in good health. This rules out the possibility of the observed residence 
status being the result of a response to the development of physical/mental impairments 
which would render the regressor potentially endogenous (Mentzakis et al., 2009). 
Difficulties in performing daily activities are measured in terms of six ADLs (getting out of 
bed, washing, dressing, eating, using the toilet and walking inside) and three IADLs 
(cooking, shopping and using the telephone). Following the literature (Bolin et al., 2008; 
Byrne et al., 2009; Paraponaris et al., 2012 among others), we proxy the magnitude of 
disability with a count variable expressed by the sum of ADLs and IADLs a frail person 
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needs help with (Num ADL). We also include a separate control for preparing meals 
(Cooking meals), an important indicator of individual autonomy as it implies the capacity 
to plan meals, gather ingredients, open cans and jars and use kitchen equipment safely. 
Such abilities denote a relatively high degree autonomy, and this item is the only one that 
displays a separate significant effect after controlling for the number of ADLs and IADLs 
the person is unable to perform autonomously. 
We also consider the amount of public help received by the DE. Public help usually 
constitutes a (partial) substitute for private care, either informal or formal. Nonetheless, 
such support may take very different forms. Since we lack detailed information on the 
specific type of public support received by the elderly, we cannot identify the separate 
impact of each form on the probability of a given caring arrangement being chosen. 
However, within the Italian institutional framework, in-kind public assistance is scarce and 
tends to be concentrated on the most severe cases. Consequently, recipients of substantial 
public assistance are usually those affected by extremely severe conditions. Hence, we 
include a dummy for individuals who received support for 40 days or more during the two 
months prior to the interview (Heavy help), which is expected to comprise persons with 
very severe disabilities. 
The second set of variables refers to household characteristics, and includes Household size 
and the share of family members who are aged 65 and over (elderly ratio). Furthermore, we 
account for the characteristics of the head of the household, such as age and chronic 
diseases. 
Economic conditions are potentially important determinants of care arrangements. Our 
survey provides information on whether the household owns its home (House ownership), 
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and on net monthly household income, that is, the sums of the respondent’s net income and 
(when present) that of the spouse (Household income). For our purposes, household income 
has several advantages over individual indicators. Firstly, it is consistent with the common 
preferences assumption according to which LTC decisions are mainly taken at household 
level. Secondly, it is relatively less influenced in case the respondent is also the main 
caregiver and therefore reduces the risk of endogeneity of the regressor (Mentzakis et al., 
2009). 
Living and care arrangements are potentially influenced also by the urban/rural area in 
which the family live, and to control for this we have included two dummy variables for 
households living in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants, and in towns with more than 
25,000 inhabitants; towns with between 5,000-25,000 inhabitants have been taken as the 
reference case. 
Moreover, family choices may also be influenced by supply constraints, such as the amount 
of public help for home health and social services provision, and the type of care 
assessment rules adopted by the local authorities. The importance of such services has 
grown over time, but in our context they are limited to low-income or severely disabled 
cases, and precise information on local social services is not readily accessible. We 
constructed several variables to capture the effects of public policies at local area level, but 
none of them turned out to be significant. For instance, as the supply of nursing home beds 
is subject to a certificate of need (CON) regulation, we calculated the municipal ratio of 
nursing home beds and, as regards community care, the share of patients receiving public 
home health care services at the district level. We also considered monthly domiciliary care 
allowances provided to families willing to keep the elderly at home. None of these controls 
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influenced our estimates, probably because the actual recipients of these programs are of a 
limited number, and there is little heterogeneity across areas. 
Finally, an additional set of controls is included to capture households’ opinions on the 
nature of public intervention in the LTC sector. In the area of care for the elderly, cultural 
and ethical views can be important determinants of household decisions alongside socio-
economic factors, and controlling for them may improve estimates by reducing unobserved 
heterogeneity across respondents. We use survey information concerning which of the 
following statements best reflects the head of the household’s view: “the public sector 
should provide LTC to everyone for the entire scope of services needed” (Universal 
access); “the public sector should provide basic LTC services to everyone and let those 
who desire additional care to top it up with their personal resources” (Need-based 
_access); “the public sector should provide basic LTC services only to low income families 
and the rest of the population should count exclusively on their own personal 
resources”(Means-tested access). The latter represents our reference case, which is omitted 
from the regression.  
The second set of controls investigates preferences over the design of public policy on 
LTC. The first group consists of households who prefer cash transfers, regardless of 
whether the caregiver is a member of the family or not (Cash_Care1). A second group 
identifies the households that support cash transfers only if the primary caregiver is a paid 
person outside the family (Cash_Care2). The reference group includes households that 
prefer in-kind support. Finally, we introduce a dummy designed to capture  whether the 
family’s decision as to where to live was influenced by their desire to be close to other 
relatives (Residence choice). All variables implying personal judgement have been included 
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in the second set of regressions only (Model B), since they might reflect personal 
experiences directly connected with the particular living arrangement chosen by the 
household. 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Simultaneous choice models 
Table 2 presents the MNL estimates where the decision across the three alternative 
arrangements is assumed to be simultaneous. As choice set partitioning tests, we performed 
the Hausman and McFadden test (1984) which indicates that with regard to our data, the 
IIA hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, since the literature outlines possible problems 
with the power of this test, which sometimes supports the validity of the IIA hypothesis 
even in cases where such may be problematic (Long and Freese, 2005; Cheng and Long, 
2007), we also estimate a MNProb model which provides a smoother variance structure 
(Table 3). The results are fairly robust across specifications, thus confirming that, contrary 
to expectations, the IIA hypothesis is not a serious concern in the case of our data.  
Moving on to the empirical results, in the multinomial specifications the probabilities of 
Residential Care and Informal Home Care are estimated against Paid Home Care, which 
has been taken as the reference case. We see that RC is predominantly determined by 
severity indicators, such as the number of ADLs and IADLs the individual is unable to 
perform autonomously, difficulty preparing meals and the presence of intense in-kind 
public support. 
Households living in small towns and rural areas also display a higher propensity to 
institutionalise the dependent family members, whereas in large towns and cities PHC is 
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more frequently chosen. At first glance this may appear counterintuitive, since small towns 
tend to be characterised by more traditional lifestyles and stronger family ties, which in turn 
are usually associated with a greater propensity for informal care. However, the supply of 
assisted living facilities and personal care services in the Italian market may help explain 
this finding. Because of the high cost of rental accommodation in towns and cities, there is 
a larger per-capita supply of residential beds in less densely populated areas, usually within 
smaller municipalities. Consequently, urban areas are more likely to suffer a shortage of 
beds, requiring  families to spend considerable time and money on visiting elderly family 
members on a regular basis, thus making residential care a relatively less attractive solution 
for those living in large towns and cities. However, personal caregivers tend to be 
concentrated in urban areas. Taken together, both factors contribute towards making PHC 
relatively more accessible for those living in densely populated areas. 
Unlike RC, the IHC option is influenced by characteristics other than those related to 
severity. As regards DE characteristics, those who lived alone before becoming dependent,  
are much more likely to opt for PHC rather than for IHC. Recent evidence (Kalwij et al., 
2013) suggests that for frail individuals living alone, informal home care provided by 
friends and neighbours often replaces the more limited support provided by family 
members. On the other hand, our data would suggest that this potential safety net does not 
appear strong enough to fully compensate for the reduced potential informal help from the 
family circle, as those living alone at the onset of disability are more likely to receive 
formal home care rather than informal home care. This probability is also positively 
associated with age, but not with the length of dependency or the number of ADLs the 
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individual cannot perform autonomously; this would suggest that PHC is mostly driven not 
by more severe disability, but by other organisational needs the family may have. 
As regards family characteristics, the coefficient for household income is significant and 
negative, thus indicating that low-income groups may still  find it difficult to access PHC, 
despite the fact that poor regulation of the Italian market reduces the cost of home care 
services. Two factors are expected to contribute to the result: for low-income groups, 
budget considerations negatively affect the allocation of funds to paid care, while at the 
same time these groups may also face a lower opportunity cost of time, compared to high-
income families. House ownership has no significant impact on our estimates. The result 
seems to suggest that income flows affect LTC choices more than wealth stocks, due to the 
limited liquidity of real assets. However, since we lack information on house values and 
mortgages, it is also possible that house ownership represent a poor proxy  of a household’s 
accumulated wealth, particularly given the high proportion of home owners in Italy. 
Finally, a head of the household suffering from chronic disease is associated with a lower 
probability of informal care provision, whereas this probability increases with the 
proportion of elderly people in the household. Both results are consistent with those supply-
side arguments based on the potential for informal care within the family. 
A relevant role is also played by the attitudes of the head of the household. The Residence 
choice variable can be interpreted as a proxy for the strength of family ties. As expected, 
those who claim that the desire to live close to their relatives was the most important 
determinant in their residence choice, are more likely to keep their elderly at home and 
provide care through the family network. Household’s opinions on the financing of LTC 
service also influence the decision: families who prefer universal public intervention for 
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LTC and support cash transfers if the primary caregiver is a paid person outside the family, 
are more likely to opt for paid home care. This results confirms the importance of 
controlling for cultural factors not only at the macro, but also at the micro, level. 
We fail to find any influence of DE gender in the estimated models, indicating that 
households adopt similar responses to the frailty of their relatives irrespective of the gender 
of the persons involved, once socio-economic status and living conditions have been taken 
into account. This is at odds with results indicating that women are more frequent recipients 
of formal care than men. Moreover, household size is also not very significant, contrary to 
what has been suggested in recent studies (Bonsang, 2009; Paraponaris et al., 2012). The 
inclusion of a dummy for the presence of a housewife, a figure often claimed to play a 
crucial role in the decision to maintain elderly household’s members at home, was not 
significant either, and the variable was not included in the final specification. We also tried 
different alternatives for family education, but none of them turned out to be significant. 
 
5.2 Sequential choice models 
Table 4 shows estimates for the bivariate probit with sample selection. Although not strictly 
necessary under a fully parametric approach (Wilde, 2000; Monfardini and Radice, 2008), 
the variable Heavy help is omitted from the second stage in order to reinforce identification. 
The variable captures substantial public support traditionally associated with those cases 
requiring skilled assistance, often with a medical component. Since personal care provided 
either by the family or by unskilled paid helpers, is a poor substitute for such specialised 
care, it is reasonable to assume that the variable does not influence the choice between IHC 
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and PHC, while it is expected to affect the choice between residential and home care, as the 
former is more appropriate for ensuring regular medical supervision. 
The null hypothesis of ρ=0  is not rejected (table 4) and, consequently, separate estimations 
are unbiased and ensure efficiency gains, whereas a joint estimation would be required 
under non-null correlation. Table 5 presents two separate probit equations, where the 
decision between RC and HC is estimated for the entire sample, and the decision between 
IHC and PHC for those observations where home care was chosen in the first stage. 
Coefficients and significance levels are robust when shifting from joint to separate 
estimations. 
The comparison between the first and second stage highlights the differing role  of severity 
conditions. With the exception of age, all proxies for the magnitude of disability influence 
the choice between RC and HC, while they do not affect the one between IHC and PHC. 
The more severe the dependency, the more likely it is the institutionalisation of the frail 
person. The result holds for all the proxies (length of disability and number of ADLs and 
IADLs the person is unable to perform), and confirms that the probability of 
institutionalisation is positively affected by deterioration in  health and functional ability 
(Stern, 1995).  
Individuals living alone are more likely to be  institutionalised, and to purchase assistance 
in the market in the case of HC. This is in line with previous findings according to which 
older adults living alone are more likely to use formal services and to be admitted to 
residential care facilities (Heiss et al., 2003), and this may be explained by the reluctance of 
the elderly and of their adult children to cohabit in response to the onset of disability (past 
habits, distance, problems to accommodate a new person in the house): paying a  caregiver 
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helps towards keeping an elderly person at home even when that person’s self-sufficiency 
diminishes. 
People currently receiving substantial public support (Heavy help) are more likely to be 
institutionalised, confirming that the variable is a good proxy for the need for skilled care. 
As previously discussed, the variable has been omitted from the second stage equation for 
identification purposes. It is not expected to affect the choice between different types of 
home care, since it identifies subjects in need of highly specialised assistance for which 
neither the family, nor paid helpers, usually possess the necessary professional skills.  
Furthermore, in the sequential choice process household size does not affect results, 
whereas house ownership has a (limited) impact, restricted to the decision to hire a 
caregiver. The coefficient for income is statistically significant and displays the expected 
sign, with high-income groups more likely to opt for the more costly alternatives at each 
stage, i.e. residential and paid home care, respectively. Interestingly, the income variable 
has a larger impact on the choice of hiring a caregiver, than on the institutionalisation of the 
dependent person, a decision which, as we have seen, depends largely on severity as well. 
The presence of income barriers to accessing formal LTC services inevitably raises equity 
concerns, which are exacerbated if one considers that  not only the choice of the caring 
arrangement, but also the magnitude of limitations in daily activities, may be influenced by 
socio-economic status as well as demographic and health conditions, which in turn may 
give rise to undesirable forms of social exclusion (Pascual and Cantarero 2007; Davin, 
Paraponaris and Verger, 2009).  
Households for whom the desire to live close to their relatives was the most important 
determinant in their choice of residence, are more likely to keep their elderly at home, and 
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if so, also to provide care directly rather than acquiring such services in the market. 
Interestingly, the coefficients of the remaining set of controls are robust to the inclusion of 
variables reflecting households’ views, which also improves the significance of several 
estimated coefficients. This suggests that controlling for such factors actually enhances the 
accuracy of the estimates by capturing part of individual unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
In Italy, elderly care is increasingly delegated to privately paid caregivers, a trend which 
together with other ongoing socio-demographic changes, requires a better understanding of 
elderly care arrangements in order to respond effectively to the changing demand for LTC. 
The paper provides empirical insights into the determinants of households’ choices between 
residential care, and informal and formal home care for older adults suffering limitations to 
their ability to perform daily activities. Our results indicate that severity conditions plays a 
major role in the decision to institutionalise the dependent elderly than family 
characteristics do. Socio-economic status positively influences the probability of 
institutionalisation, but it plays a limited role compared to the one played in the choice 
between informal and formal home care, where it is strongly, positively associated to the 
latter. 
Residential care appears to attract the most severe cases, with a reasonably good matching 
between intensity of need and supply of skilled services. These results can be interpreted in 
the light of social norms concerning filial responsibility, which continue to  attach social 
stigma to institutionalisation, often seen as an option of last resort. To the extent that 
functional limitations still permit the elderly to be looked after at home, two different 
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responses emerge: high income groups more frequently hire an external caregiver, while 
low income families tend to opt for informal care. Given the high burden and opportunity 
costs of informal care, and the prospective reduction in the potential of care provision 
within the family, policy measures should be designed to facilitate access to the market of 
personal services also on the part of middle- and low-income groups. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful to participants to iHEA World Congress, the Conference on Long 
Term Care held at ZEW (Mannheim), the International Conference on Evidence-based 
Policy in Long-Term Care (ILPN 2012) held at the London School of Economics and the 
SIEP conference held at the University of Pavia for useful suggestions. We thank Rossella 
Verzulli for comments on a previous version of the paper. 
 
REFERENCES 
Balia, S., Brau, R., 2013. ″A Country for Old Men? An Analysis of the Determinants of 
Long-Term Home Care in Europe″. Health Economics, in press.  
Bernheim, B.D., Shleifer, A., Summers, L., 1985. ″The strategic bequest motive″. Journal 
of Political Economy 93, 1045-76. 
Bettio, F., Simonazzi, A., Villa, P., 2006. ″Change in care regimes and female migration: 
the “care drain” in the Mediterranean.″ Journal of European Social Policy 16, 271. 
Boaz, R.F., Muller, C.F., 1994. ″Predicting the risk of permanent nursing home residence: 
The role of community help ad indicated by family helpers and prior living arrangements.″ 
Health Services Research 29, 391-414. 
Boersch-Supan, A., Hajivassiliou, V., Kotlikoff, L.J., Morris, J.N., 1990. ″Health, children 
and elderly living arrangements: a multiperiod-multinomial probit model with unobserved 
heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors.″ NBER, Working Paper: 3343. 
 26 
Boersch-Supan, A., Kotlikoff, L.J., Morris, J.N., 1988. ″The dynamics of living 
arrangements of the elderly. ″ NBER Working Papers: 2787. 
Bolin, K., Lindgren, B., Lundborg, P., 2008. ″Informal and formal care among single-living 
elderly in Europe. ″ Health Economics 17, 393-409. 
Bonsang, E., 2009. ″Does informal care from children to their elderly parents substitute for 
formal care in Europe? ″ Journal of Health Economics 28, 143-54. 
Brau, R., Lippi Bruni, M., 2008. "Eliciting the demand for long-term care coverage: a 
discrete choice modelling analysis." Health Economics 17, 411-433.  
Brau, R., Lippi Bruni, M., Pinna, A.M., 2010. ″Public vs private demand for covering long 
term care expenditures. ″ Applied Economics 42(28), 3651-68.  
Broese Van Groenou, M., Glaser, K., Tomassini, C., Jacobs, T., 2006. “Socio-economic 
status differences in the use of informal and formal help: a comparison of four European 
countries.” Ageing and Society 26, 745-766. 
Byrne, D. Goeree, M.S. Hiedemann,B., Stern, S. 2009. “Formal home health care, informal 
car, and family decision making.” International Economic Review, 50, 1205-1242. 
Cheng, S., Scott Long, J., 2007. ″Testing for IIA in the Multinomial Logit Model.″ 
Sociological Methods & Research 35, 583-600. 
Cocchi, D., Fabrizi, E., Trivisano, C., 2004. ″The construction of sampling weights in a 
survey of public interest about a sensible subject.″ Proceedings of the 7th International 
Meeting: Quantitative Methods for applied sciences, University of Siena. 
Courbage, C., Eeckhoudt, L., 2012. ″On Insuring and Caring for Parent’s Long-Term Care 
Needs. ″ Journal of Health Economics 31 (6), 842-50. 
Cremer, H., Pestieau, P. Ponthiere, G., 2012. ″The economics of long-term care: A survey.″ 
Nordic Economic Policy Review 2, 107-148. 
Davey, A., Patsios, D.,1999. ″Formal and informal community care to older adults: 
Comparative analysis of the United States and Great Britain.″ Journal of Family and 
Economic Issues 20 (3), 271-299. 
 27 
Davin B., Paraponaris A., Verger P., 2009. ″Socioeconomic determinants of the need for 
personal assistance reported by community-dwelling elderly: empirical evidence from a 
French national health survey.″ The Journal of Socio-Economics 38, 138-46. 
Di Novi, C., Jacobs, R. Migheli, M. (2013) “The quality of life of female informal 
caregivers: from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean Sea”. CHE Research Paper 84, York: 
University of York. 
Dostie, B., Léger, P.T., 2005. ″The Living arrangement dynamics of sick, elderly 
individuals. ″ Journal of Human Resources 40 (4), 989-1014. 
Greene, W., 2011. Econometric Analysis, 7th Edition, McGraw Hill, New York. 
Engers, M., Stern, S., 2002. ″Long term care and family bargaining.″ International 
Economic Review 43 (1), 73-114. 
Ettner S.L., 1996. “The opportunity costs of elder care” Journal of Human Resources, 31, 
189-205. 
Monfardini, C., Radice, R., 2008. ″Texting Exogeneity in the Bivariate Probit Model: A 
Monte Carlo study.″ Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,70, 271-282. 
Hanaoka, C., Norton, E.C., 2008. ″Informal and formal care for elderly persons: how adult 
children’s characteristics affect the use of formal care in Japan″ Social Science & Medicine 
7, 1002-1008. 
Hanley, R.J., Alecxih, L.M.B., Wiener, J.M., Kennell, D.L., 1990. ″Predicting Elderly 
Nursing Home Admissions″. Research on Aging 12 (2), 199-228. 
Hausman, J., Mc Fadden, D., 1984. ″Specification tests for the multinomial logit model″. 
Econometrica 52(5), 12219-40.  
Heiss, F., Hurd, M., Boersch-Supan, A., 2003. ″Healthy, wealthy and knowing where to 
live: predicted trajectories of health, wealth and living arrangements among the oldest old. ″ 
NBER Working Papers: 9897. 
Hiedemann, B., Stern, S., 1999. ″Strategic play among family members when making long-
term decisions.″ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organisation 40, 29-57. 
 28 
Hoerger, T.J., Picone, G.A., Sloan, F.A., 1996. ″Public Subsidies, Private Provision of Care 
and Living Arrangements of the Elderly. ″ Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 428-40. 
Isengard, B., Szydlik, M., 2012. ″Living apart (or) together? Coresidence of Elderly Parents 
and their Adult Children in Europe.″ Research on Aging 34 (4), 449-74. 
Kalwij, A., Pasini, G., Wu, M., 2013. ″Home care for the elderly: the role of relatives, 
friends and neighbors. ″ Review of Economics of the Household, DOI 10.1007/s11150-
012-9159-4. 
Kofman, E., Phizacklea, A., Raghuram, P., Sales, R., 2000. Gender and International 
Migration in Europe. London, Routledge. 
Lee, M.J., Kim, Y.S., 2012. ″Zero-inflated endogenous count in censored model: effects of 
informal family care on formal health care.″ Health Economics 21, 1119-33. 
Lippi Bruni, M., Ugolini, C., 2006. ″Assistenza a domicilio e assistenza residenziale: 
politiche di intervento e analisi empirica”, Rivista Italiana degli Economisti 11 , 241-267. 
Long, J.S., Freese, J., 2005. Regression model for categorical dependent variables using 
Stata. 2nd ed. College Sation, TX: Stata Press. 
Lo Sasso, A.T., Johnson, R.W., 2002. ″Does informal care from adult children reduce 
nursing home admissions for the elderly? ″ Inquiry 39, 279-97. 
Meng, C., Schmidt, P., 1985. ″On the cost of partial observability in the bivariate probit 
model.″ International Economic Review 26, 71-86. 
Mentzakis, E., McNamee, P., Ryan, M., 2009. “Who cares and how much: exploring 
determinants of co-residential informal care”. Review of Economics of the Household, 7, 
283-303. 
Orsini, C. 2010, “Changing the way the elderly live. Evidence from the home health care 
market in the United States”. Journal of Public Economics, 94, 142-152. 
Paraponaris, A., Bérengère, D., Verger, P., 2012. ″Formal and informal care for disabled 
elderly living in the community: an appraisal of French care composition and costs.″ 
European Journal of Health Economics 13, 327-36. 
 29 
Pascual M., Cantarero D., 2007. “Socio-demographic determinants of disabled people: An 
empirical approach based on the European Community Household Panel”. The Journal of 
Socio-Economics 36, 275–287. 
Pezzin, L.E., Kemper, P., Reschovsky, J., 1996. ″Does publicly provided home care 
substitute for family care? Experimental evidence with endogenous living arrangements.″ 
Journal of Human Resources 31(3), 650-76. 
Pezzin, L.E., Schone, B.S., 1997. ″The allocation of resources in intergenerational 
households: Adult children and their elderly parents.″ American Economic Review 87 (2), 
460-64. 
Pezzin, L.E., Schone, B.S., 1999. ″Intergenerational household formation, female labor 
supply and informal caregiving: A bargaining approach.″ Journal of Human Resources 
34(3), 475-503. 
Pezzin, L.E., Pollak, R.A., Schone, B.S., 2007. ″Efficiency in Family Bargaining: Living 
Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and Disabled Elderly Parents.″ 
CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo 53(1), 69-96. 
Sarma, S., Simpson, W., 2007. ″A panel multinomial logit analysis of elderly living 
arrangements: Evidence from aging in Manitoba longitudinal data, Canada.″, Social 
Science & Medicine 65, 2539-52. 
Simonazzi, A., 2009. ″Care regimes and national employment models.” Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 33, 211-32. 
Stern, S., 1995. ″Estimating family long-term care decisions in the presence of endogenous 
child characteristics.″ Journal of Human Resources 30 (3), 551-580.  
Stoller, E.P., 1989. ″Formal services and informal helping: the myth of service 
substitution.″ Journal of Applied Gerontology 8, 37-52. 
Suanet, B., Broese van Groneou, M.B. van Tilburg, T. 2012. “Informal and formal home-
care use among older adults in Europe: can cross national differences be explained by 
societal context and composition”, Ageing and Society, 491-515. 
 30 
Tomassini, C., Wolf, D.A., 2000. ″Stability and Change in the Living Arrangements of 
Older Italian Women. 1990-1995.″ Genus LVI, 203-19. 
Tomassini, C., Wolf, D.A, Rosina A., 2003. ″Parental housing assistance and parent-child 
proximity in Italy.″ Journal of Marriage and Family 5, 700-715. 
United Nations, 2012. World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York.  
Van de Ven, W.P.M.M., Van Praag, B.M.S., 1981. ″The Demand for Deductibles in Private 
Health Insurance: A Probit Model with Sample Selection.″ Journal of Econometrics 17, 
229-52. 
van Houtven, C.H., Coe, N.B., Skira M.M., 2013. ″The effect of informal care on work and 
ages.″ Journal of Health Economics 32, 240-252. 
van Houtven, C.H., Norton, E.C., 2004. ″Informal care and health care use of older adults.″ 
Journal of Health Economics 23, 1159-80. 
Villosio, C., Bizzotto, G., 2011. ″Once there were wives and daughters, now there are 
badanti.″ Walqing Social Partnership Series no.14, Walqing Research, 7th Framework 
Programme, European Commission. 
Wilde, J., 2000. ″Identification of multiple equation probit models with endogenous 
dummy regressors.″ Economic Letters 69, 309-12. 
Wolf, D.A., Pinnelli, A., 1989. ″Living arrangements and social networks of older women 
in Italy.″ Research on Aging 11, 354-73. 
 
 31 
APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1. The simultaneous decision process 
 
 
The household has three alternatives:  
1. to institutionalize the elderly in an assisted living  facility (Residential Care, RC) 
2. to provide care at home through informal family support (Informal Home Care, IHC) 
3. to hire an external caregiver to provide care at home (Paid Home Care, PHC) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The sequential decision process 
 
The decision process can be articulated in two steps.  
 FIRST  the household decides whether  
 to institutionalize the elderly  in an assisted living  facility (Residential Care, RC)  
 or to provide care at home (Home Care, HC) 
SECOND, for those who stay at home, the household decides  
whether to provide care directly (Informal Home Care, IHC)  
or to hire an external caregiver (Paid Home Care, PHC) 
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Table 1. Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
DE characteristics   
Age DE Age of DE in years  77.38806 16.46931 
Female DE = 1 if DE is a female  .69527 .46098 
LTC spell  Spell of disability in years 8.88589 12.79990 
Single living  = 1 if DE lived alone before disability .24551 .43103 
Heavy help Public support for > 40 days .026334 .16018 
Num ADL Number of ADLs and IADLs in which DE is not self-sufficient  2.36196 2.46782 
Cooking meals = 1 if the DE is unable to prepare meals .707831 .45544 
Family characteristics   
Age Head of the household Age of the head of the household 48.84402 12.80121 
Chronic Head of the 
household 
= 1 if the head of the household suffers of chronic conditions .20072 .40067 
Elderly ratio Members >65/total number of household members .12473 .28147 
Household size Number of family members of PR  2.81423 1.20968 
Economic characteristics   
Household income Household income in Euro (PR+ PR spouse, if present) 1930.752 878.6728 
House ownership = 1 if PR and his family have the house ownership .79217 .40589 
Spatial variables   
Towns > 25,000  = 1 if PR lives in a town with more than 25.000 inhabitants .11317 .31691 
Towns < 5,000  = 1 if PR lives in a town with less than 5.000 inhabitants. .061922 .24110 
Family opinions   
Universal access Public sector should provide universal coverage for LTC .24769 .43182 
Need-based access Public sector should provide fundamental LTC .30890 .46220 
Residence choice = 1 if PR's residence choice was influenced by the will to live 
close to other relatives (family ties) 
.19217 .39415 
Cash Care 1 =1 if PR supports cash transfer to the family without 
justification of how the benefit is spent 
.28470 .45143 
Cash Care 2 =1 if PR supports cash transfer to the family only for external 
paid helper 
.128826 .33512 
PR = person responding to the survey 
DE = disabled elderly 
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 Table 2.  The simultaneous decision process: multinomial logit specification 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
RESIDENTIAL CARE MODEL A MODEL B 
Age DE -.0010  .0280 -.0072  .0183 
Female DE -.2639  .5738 -.3683  .5856 
LTC spell .0305  .0220 .0330  .0230 
Single living .3288  .5206 .5500  .6034 
Heavy help   1.6879  .7059**   1.6759  .7633** 
Num ADL .2296  .1032** .2370  .1063** 
Cooking meals 1.09699  .7958 1.5790  .8193** 
Age Head of the household -.0223  .0236 -.0371  .0254 
Chronic Head of the household -.3214  .5243 -.0572  .5884 
Elderly ratio .8137 1.4458 .6455 1.6690 
Household size .0457  .2074 .0538  .2353 
Household income .0000  .0002 .0001  .0003 
House ownership -.7890  .6685 -.5948  .6827 
Town>25000 -2.6944 1.1853** -2.7227 1.129** 
Town<5000 1.6109 1.2465 2.0431 1.015** 
Universal access   -.4341 .6058 
Need-based access   -.6465 .5281 
Residence choice   -.5827 .5740 
Cash care 1   .0676 .5559 
Cash care 2   -.5587 .6214 
Constant -.4885 2.7972 -.9096 3.0024 
INFORMAL HOME CARE     
Age DE -.0472  .0230**      -.0539  .0215**      
Female DE -.4975  .4414      -.5583  .4698      
LTC spell -.0147  .0176      -.0128  .0187      
Single living -.6982  .4269     -1.0403  .4967**      
Heavy help -.0207  .0864 .0835  .7674 
Num ADL .0207  .0864    -.0218  .0886    
Cooking meals -.6550  .4620    -.8122  .4744*    
Age Head of the household -.0244  .0187     -.0209  .0207     
Chronic Head of the household -1.0276  .4213**      -.7949  .4870*      
Elderly ratio 2.2307 1.0437**     1.9731 1.0727*     
Household size .1689  .1738  .2946  .1991  
Household income -.0006  .0002***     -.0007  .0002***     
House ownership -.2111  .5248   .0557  .5441   
Town>25,000 -.4087  .5572    -.1025  .6704    
Town<5,000 1.2942  1.2587     1.5354  .8570*     
Universal access   -1.1639  .4662**      
Need-based access   .6843  .4365 
Residence choice   1.1404  .5060** 
Cash care 1   .4290  .4587 
Cash care 2   -1.6090  .6178*** 
Constant 8.2377 2.0242*** 8.4399 2.1274*** 
Pseudo r2  .2169  .2832 
Log pseudo likelihood  -184.6198  -168.9978 
Sample size      251  251 
Hausman Test 
Omitted Chi2    df. P>chi2 Evidence 
0 -1.867    20 1.000   for Ho    
1 -253.565    20 0.000    for Ho 
2 -9.369     20 1.000   for Ho    
*** p-value < 0.01 ** p-value < 0.05 * p-value < 0.10 
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Table 3.  The simultaneous decision process: multinomial probit specification   
 Coef.   Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
RESIDENTIAL CARE MODEL A MODEL B 
Age DE -.0014  .0197 .0001  .0202 
Female DE -.2752  .3849 -.2936  .3939 
LTC spell .0208  .0145 .0229  .0154 
Single living .327  .3609 .4825  .4026 
Heavy help   1.0991  .4870**   1.0646  .5102** 
Num ADL .1584  .0729** .1622  .0737** 
Cooking meals .7635  .4680 1.0869  .5019** 
Age Head of the household -.0183  .0160 -.0267  .0166 
Chronic Head of the 
household 
-.2916  .3699 -.1915  .3962 
Elderly ratio .6680  .9592 .7429 1.0157 
Household size .0476  .2074 .0538  .1585 
Household income .0000  .0002 .0000  .0002 
House ownership -.4874  .4566 -.4057  .4689 
Town>25000 -1.9184  .6952*** -1.9043  .6985*** 
Town<5000 1.0473  .7671 1.4696  .7050** 
Universal access   .1724  .4087 
Need-based access   -.4375  .3622 
Residence choice   -.4210  .4156 
Cash care 1   .0864  .3777 
Cash care 2   -.3257  .4499 
Constant .0382 1.9178 -.0884 2.0265 
INFORMAL HOME CARE     
Age DE -.0385  .0167**      -.0449  .0164***      
Female DE -.3802  .3167      -.3675  .3363      
LTC spell -.0128  .0125      -.0102  .0132     
Single living -.5499  .3225*     -.7915  .3465**      
Heavy help -.6787  .4939 -.1431  .4884 
Num ADL .0044  .0648    -.0155  .0652    
Cooking meals -.4680  .3409    -.6021  .3545*    
AGE Head of the household -.0192  .0137     -.0148  .0147     
Chronic Head of the 
household 
-.7699  .3195**      -.6350  .3480*      
Elderly ratio 1.6064  .7175**     1.4313  .7127**     
Household size .1469  .1275  .2523  .1424*  
Household income -.0005  .0001***     -.0006  .0002***     
House ownership -.1078  .3705   .0586  .3784   
Town>25,000 -.2769  .4389    -.0665  .4836    
Town<5,000 .8975  .7683     1.2429  .6189**     
Universal access   -.9055  .3302***      
Need-based access   .5725  .3127* 
Residence choice   .9400  .3691** 
Cash care 1   .3951  .3315 
Cash care 2   -1.1399  .4435*** 
Constant 6.5747 1.4958*** 6.5933 1.5457*** 
 
    
Log pseudo likelihood  -185.0604  -169.8171 
Sample size      251  251 
*** p-value < 0.01 ** p-value < 0.05 * p-value < 0.10 
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Table 4. The sequential decision process: probit model with sample selection  
 Coef.   Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
HOME CARE MODEL A MODEL B 
Age DE -.0160 .0134 -.0236 .0127* 
Female DE .0255 .2590 .2165 .2656 
LTC spell -.0217 .0086** -.0248 .0084*** 
Single living -.4925 .2466** -.7946 .2951*** 
Heavy help   -1.2758 .2755***   -1.0504 .2319*** 
Num ADL -.1217 .0526** -.1296 .0512** 
Cooking meals -.7492 .3185** -1.1274 .3967*** 
Age Head of the household .0032 .0106 .0130 .0089 
Chronic Head of the household -.0500 .2643 .0634 .2797 
Elderly ratio .2625 .5635 .0398 .6019 
Household size .0391 .0882 .1201 .0980 
Household income -.0002 .0001* -.0003 .0001** 
House ownership .3338 .2853 .3317 .2836 
Town>25000 1.5440 .6057** 1.7060 .5975*** 
Town<5000 -.2055 .4371 -.3677 .4494 
Universal access   -.6607 .2898** 
Need-based access   .6628 .2600** 
Residence choice   .8983 .2849*** 
Cash care 1   .2354 .2352 
Cash care 2   -.0267 .3319 
Constant 3.494 1.308*** 3.6498 1.3513*** 
PAID HOME CARE     
Age DE .0248 .0129** .0313 .0117***      
Female DE .3205  .2391 .2065 .2420      
LTC spell .0057  .0096 .0033 .0091      
Single living .3108     .2436 .4524 .2732*      
Num ADL  -.0437  .0562 -.0461 .0468    
Cooking meals -.2229  .2492 .2580 .2505    
Age Head of the household .0136  .0099 .0129 .0080     
Chronic Head of the household .5666  .2520** .4729 .2441*      
Elderly ratio -.9642  .5775* -1.1801 .5088**     
Household size -.0990  .0930 -.1525 .0910*  
Household income .0004      .0001*** .0004 .0001***     
House ownership .0348  .2808* -.0545 .2946   
Town>25,000 .3604 .3123 .1937 .3449     
Town<5,000 -5978 .5493 -7896 .4398*     
Universal access   .6699 .2784**      
Need-based access   -.3335 .2349 
Residence choice   -.3914 .2447* 
Cash care 1   -.1962 .0242 
Cash care 2   .4745 .2834* 
Constant -4.5536 1.2684*** -4.7258 1.0866*** 
rho .7312 .4745   1 9.53e-1  
Wald test for rho=0:  chi2(1)=0.83 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3610 
chi2(1)=0.01 
Prob > chi2 = 0.9059 
Log pseudo likelihood -183.7212  -166.5682  
Sample size    251     
*** p-value < 0.01 ** p-value < 0.05 * p-value < 0.10 
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Table 5. The sequential decision process: probit model (separate estimation)  
 Coef.   Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
HOME CARE MODEL A MODEL B 
Age DE -.0266 .0098*** -.0299 .0112*** 
Female DE .0373 .2495 .0877 .2552 
LTC spell -.0224 .0089** -.0239 .0090*** 
Single living -.4649 .2460* -.793 .2705*** 
Heavy help   -1.1887 .2744***   -.9689 .2919*** 
Num ADL -.1227 .0491** -.1414 .0508*** 
Cooking meals -.7892 .3127** -1.055 .3641*** 
Age head of the householdr .0037 .0106 .0138 .0107 
Chronic Head of the household -.1213 .2472 -.1441 .2693 
Elderly ratio .3587 .5656 .1992 .6267 
Household size .0302 .0873 .0765 .0958 
Household income -.0002 .0001 -.0003 .0001** 
House ownership .2867 .2869 .2799 .2921 
Town>25,000 1.4036 .5095*** 1.5823 .5295*** 
Town<5,000 -.3064 .4276 -.40593 .4412 
Universal access   -.6433 .299** 
Need-based access   .6199 .2350*** 
Residence choice   .8488 .2675*** 
Cash care 1   .0813 .2262 
Cash care 2   -.1840 .3283 
Constant 4.3518 1.1018*** 4.3292 1.2537*** 
Wald chi2  62.23   Prob>chi2=0.0000 61.93  Prob>chi2=0.0000 
Log pseudo likelihood  -93.3839  -86.3806 
Sample size      276  276 
 
PAID HOME CARE     
Age DE .0327 .0095*** .0366 .0104***      
Female DE .3546  .2437 .3025 .2557      
LTC spell .0133  .0094 .0090 .0097      
Single living .4271     .2505* .6216 .2882**      
Num ADL  -.0190  .0524 -.0018 .0524    
Cooking meals -.3454  .2520 .4212 .2622    
Age Head of the household .0143  .0102 .0104 .0109     
Chronic Head of the household .6139  .2425* .5559 .2652**      
Elderly ratio -1.0925  .580* -1.1724 .5381**     
Household size -.1331  .0970 -.1810 .1079*  
Household income .0005      .0001*** .0005 .0001***     
House ownership .0348  .2808* -.1423 .3054   
Town>25,000 .1937 .3189 -.0085 .3773     
Town<5,000 -5990 .5803 -.9062 .4562**     
Universal access   .7746 .2884**      
Need-based access   -.4545 .2543* 
Residence choice   -.6556 .2725** 
Cash care 1   -.2764 .2594 
Cash care 2   .7561 .3166** 
Constant -5.2970 1.0253*** -5.1756 1.1266*** 
Wald chi2  50.95   Prob>chi2=0.0000 64.32  Prob>chi2=0.0000 
Log pseudo likelihood  -95.5723  -85.5220 
Sample size      228  228 
*** p-value < 0.01 ** p-value < 0.05 * p-value < 0.10 
 
 
